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I. INTRODUCTION
The states have broad authority under the police powers' to or-
der medical treatment for minor children when intervention is nec-
essary to protect the general health and welfare of the community.
This authority may be exercised even when it impinges on funda-
mental rights.2 However, when a lack of medical treatment does
not threaten the health and welfare of the general public, the
state's power to order medical treatment for a minor over parental
objections is less certain.
3
The scope of parental rights to refuse medical treatment for mi-
1. Authority for the exercise of state police power is found in U.S. CONST.
amend. X, which states: '"he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
2. The focus of the state's interest in this type of circumstance is on curing or
eliminating a specific disease or condition which poses a danger to the com-
munity. See, e.g., Wright v. DeWitt School Dist. No. 1, 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d
644 (1965) (upheld the authority of the state to require smallpox immuniza-
tions of all school-age children despite parents' religious objections to medi-
cal treatment); Powers v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d
590 (1972) (court upheld the requirement of a physical examination before
state benefits could be granted under aid to the disabled program, although
the examination was contrary to the applicant's religious beliefs); Kraus v.
City of Cleveland, 55 Ohio App. 6, 116 N.E.2d 779 (1953) (court held that city
could fluoridate its water, although some residents protested this action on
the ground that drinking fluoridated water would constitute receiving medi-
cal treatment in violation of plaintiffs' religious beliefs); State v. Armstrong,
32 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952) (upheld requirement of chest x-ray for
tuberculosis of all students at college, although it was contrary to plaintiff's
religious convictions).
3. See notes 12-14 & accompanying text infra.
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nor children, where the refusal only affects the health of the indi-
vidual child, has been the focus of much discussion and debate.
4
The state's authority to intervene in this area of parental rights has
expanded with the advent and utilization of neglect statutes, which
often impose an express duty on parents to provide a minimum
amount of medical care for their children.5 Although a state may
intervene under the authority of a neglect statute to order medical
treatment over parental objections when the treatment is immedi-
ately necessary to save the life of the child,6 the state-imposed lim-
itations on parental autonomy are less clear when the child's life is
not immediately threatened,7 or when the results of the proposed
treatment are uncertain.
8
4. See generally Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal
of the State's Role In Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J. 887 (1975);
Baker, Court Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEv.-
MAR. L. REv. 296 (1969); Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-
Making Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REv. 285 (1976);
Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk- On State Supervention of Pa-
rental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977); Paulsen, The Legal Framework For
Child Protection, 66 CoLUM. L REv. 679 (1966); Thomas, Child Abuse and Ne-
glect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50
N.C. L. REv. 293 (1972); Wald, State Intervention On Behalf of Neglected Chil-
dren: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975); Note,
Parent and Child-State's Right to Take Custody of a Child In Need of Medi-
cal Care, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 342 (1963); Note, Judicial Power to Order Medi-
cal Treatment for Minors Over Objections of Their Guardians, 14 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 84 (1962).
5. For a good analysis and comparison of state neglect laws, including tables
showing which statutes include parental refusal to provide necessary medi-
cal care for the child as a ground for state intervention, see Katz, Howe &
McGrath, Child Neglect Laws In America (pts. I-IV), 9 FAm. L.Q. 3, 7, 51, 73
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. For cases in which the court implied a
duty on parents to furnish medical care, although the neglect statute did not
expressly authorize state intervention for this reason, see Custody of a Mi-
nor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978), affd on rehearing, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass.
1979); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962).
6. See, e.g., People v. Labrenz, 411 IlM. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); State v. Per-
ricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
7. For cases where courts ordered medical treatment although the child's life
was not immediately threatened, see In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), affd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), af d,
29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Rotkowitz, 175
Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263
N.Y.S. 552 (1933). For cases where medical treatment was not ordered under
similar circumstances, see In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In
re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (remanding to trial court), affig trial
court decision on remand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973); In re Hudson, 13
Wash. 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
8. For cases where courts ordered medical treatment although the results of the
proposed treatment were highly unpredictable, see In re Sampson, 65 Misc.
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The problems of defining the extent of parental duties under
these statutes, the scope of parental rights in the decision-making
process, and the state's power to intervene in the "best interests of
the child" have arisen in a wide variety of factual contexts. Re-
cently, cases have presented questions involving: court ordered
continuation of extraordinary means of medical care in order to
keep a child alive who had no hope for recovery;9 conflict between
state interests and parental free exercise of religious rights under
the first amendment;' 0 and emergency situations requiring imme-
diate treatment to save the life of a child."
Unlike these cases, Custody of a Minor 2 marks one of the first
instances where a court has confronted the issue of whether to or-
der the continuation of chemotherapy treatments for a minor child
over parental opposition,' 3 where the danger of nontreatment was
not immediate death 14 and the predicted results of the proposed
2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970), aifid, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(1971), aFd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Vasko,
238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933). Contra, In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d
387 (1972) (remanding to trial court), affg trial court decision on remand, 452
Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
9. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). For a discussion of the differ-
ences between extraordinary and ordinary care, see Sharpe & Hargest, Life-
saving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 36 FORDm. L RaV. 695, 700-02
(1968). See also notes 112-14 & accompanying text infra.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People v. Labrenz, 411
Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); John F. Kennedy Me-
morial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971); State v. Perricone, 37
N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Sampson, 65 Misc.
2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970), affid, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(1971), affd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
One commentator has asserted that a good faith religious belief is no de-
fense to a parent's failure to provide corrective or preventive medical atten-
tion to minor children. Baker, supra note 4, at 299. However, some courts
have held that medical treatment cannot be ordered over parental objections
based on religious beliefs. E.g., Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590,155 A.2d 684 (1959);
In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292
A.2d 387 (1972) (remanding to trial court), affig trial court decision on re-
mand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973). A recent decision held that one par-
ent's objection to blood tranfusions could not be the primary basis for award
of the custody of a minor to the other parent in a divorce action. Osier v.
Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980).
11. See, e.g., People v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert denied, 344 U.S.
824 (1952); Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); State v. Per-
ricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
12. 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978), affid on rehearing, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979).
13. The Court of Appeals of New York was also faced with this issue in the recent
case of In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648,393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
14. Although Custody of a Minor did not involve a medical emergency, the court
pointed out that time of treatment and the continuity of treatment were im-
portant factors in determining the child's chances for survival. 379 N.E.2d at
1980] 1095
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
treatment were far from certain. 15
The court was faced with two critical issues. The first issue con-
cerned whether the parents could refuse medical treatment when
the treatment offered a "substantial chance for cure"1 6 of the
child's disease. The second issue involved the parents' right to
choose between alternative methods of treatment. The Minor
court upheld the state's authority to order medical treatment de-
spite parental objection where treatment affords the child a sub-
stantial chance for cure.17 The court also upheld the power of the
state to intervene in parental choices between alternative treat-
ments where the parental choice is not proven to be a medically
effective alternative.
18
II. HISTORICAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND MODERN
INFRINGEMENT BY THE STATE
A. Necessity of Parental Consent
In tort law, touching a person without his consent constitutes a
battery.' 9 Therefore, in order to protect himself from potential
civil liability, a physician must obtain a patient's consent before
treating him. Prior to receiving such consent, the doctor has an
affirmative duty to explain to the patient the material facts con-
cerning the treatment, the available alternatives, and the collateral
risks. If the patient then gives his competent, voluntary, and un-
derstanding consent to proceed, the doctor is protected from po-
tential tort liability for battery which would otherwise arise from
medical treatment.
20
This requirement of "informed consent," while serving a useful
function in the field of adult medical care,21 runs into difficulty
when it is applied to pediatric medicine. Under the common law a
child is legally incapable of giving his consent to a battery;22 there-
1065. Expert testimony predicted that without treatment the child would
probably die in one to six months. Id. at 1063.
15. The court found that the child's chances for survival if he continued chemo-
therapy were "slightly higher than fifty percent." Id. at 1057. On rehearing,
the court found that his chances for cure if treatment continued were "close
to fifty percent." 393 N.E.2d at 840.
16. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1056.
17. Id.
18. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 846.
19. G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS 137 (1975); W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 34-37 (4th Ed. 1971).
20. G. ANNAS, supra note 19, at 57; Bennett, supra note 4, at 286.
21. An adult patient who is conscious and mentally competent has the legal right
to refuse any medical or surgical procedure, even if it is a life-sustaining
measure. G. ANNAS, supra note 19, at 79, 81.
22. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 286-87; Note, The Minor's Right to Consent to
1096 [Vol. 59:1093
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fore, any touching of a minor by a doctor, even with the minor's
consent, is technically a battery.23 Parents and guardians have tra-
ditionally been accorded the legal capacity to consent to medical
treatment for minor children.24 Therefore, it is only with their ap-
proval that medical treatment of a child may be rendered non-tor-
tious.25 This traditional notion operates to give parents control
over most medical care decisions concerning the treatment of chil-
dren.
26
B. State Infringement on Parental Autonomy
State legislatures and courts have carved out exceptions to the
rule that parental consent is required before a minor may receive
medical treatment. Parental consent is not required if a child is in
a life-threatening situation and the parent or guardian cannot be
located. 27 Some states also recognize a "mature minor" exception
Medical Treatment: A Corollary of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 48 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1417 (1975). The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 59 (1934) states: "(1)
If a person whose interest is invaded is at the time by reason of his youth...
incapable of understanding or appreciating the consequences of the invasion,
the assent of such a person to the invasion is not effective as a consent
thereto."
23. G. ANNAS, supra note 19, at 137.
24. Baker, supra note 4, at 297; In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624
(Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941); W. PROSSER, supra note 19, at 102-03.
25. G. ANNAS, supra note 19, at 137. Bennett, supra note 4, at 286.
26. Bennett, supra note 4, at 286. Not only may the parent exercise the authority
to refuse consent to medical treatment, but parental autonomy may also be
exercised to consent to non-beneficial medical treatment for one child which
will save the life of a sibling. Under these factual circumstances, the poten-
tial psychological effect on the non-iU child, resulting from a refusal to allow
treatment, is an important consideration in the court decisions. See Hart v.
Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (1972) (court allowed parents to con-
sent to kidney transplant from identical twin to his brother, where transplant
was necessary to save the life of the second twin); Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1967) (parents could consent to kidney transplant from in-
competent adult to his brother in order to save the brother's life).
27. HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HosPrrAL LAw 82 (2d ed. 1974); G. ANNAS,
supra note 19, at 137; Bennett, supra note 4, at 289; Note, supra note 22, at
1419. In Luka v. Lowries, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912), the doctor ampu-
tated a minor's foot which had been crushed in a train accident without first
obtaining parental consent. The court explained the policy of the emergency
rule exception in upholding the doctor's action:
To hold that a surgeon must wait until perhaps he may be able to
secure the consent of the parents before giving to the injured one the
benefit of his skill and learning, to the end that life may be preserved,
would, we believe, result in the loss of many lives which might other-
wise be saved.
Id. at 135, 136 N.W. at 1110-11. However, some courts have held that doctors
were liable for treating minors without obtaining parental consent. See, e.g.,
1980] 1097
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to the parental consent rule,28 which allows an unemancipated mi-
nor who is capable of understanding and appreciating the conse-
quences of the proposed medical procedure to consent to the
treatment.2 9 More commonly recognized is the "emanicipated mi-
nor" exception which allows emancipated minors to consent to
their own medical care.30 States have also enacted statutes which
expressly emancipate minors in specific areas of health care deci-
sion-making, such as prenatal care, venereal diesease and drug de-
pendency,3 1 due to the recognition that to require parental consent
Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260
N.W. 99 (1935); Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956).
Several state legislatures have adopted statutes which expressly allow a
doctor to treat a minor without parental consent if a delay in treatment will
endanger the child. For example, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12F (West
Supp. 1980) allows doctors to treat child without parental consent if a delay in
treatment will "endanger the life, limb, or mental well-being of the patient."
See also MD. ANN. CODE, art. 43, § 135 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-71
(1972); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 10104 (Purdon 1977).
28. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN., § 41-41-3(h) (1972). Kansas has recognized this rule by
judicial decision. See Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc.,
205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330 (1970). See also Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F.
Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
29. G. ANAs, supra note 19, at 138; Bennett, supra note 4, at 290-91; Note, supra
note 22, at 1419. See, e.g., Bishop v. Shurly, 237 Mich. 76, 211 N.W. 75 (1926);
Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906); Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash.
2d 16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967).
30. G. ANNs, supra note 19, at 138; Note, supra note 22, at 1419. See ALAsKA
STAT. § 09.65.100(1) (Supp. 1979); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-132 (1967); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-363(f) (1976); CAL Cry. CODE §§ 25.6-.7, 34.6 (Deering 1971);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-103 (Supp. 1979); 1979 Conn. Pub. Acts 79-397, § 5;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 707 (1974); IL1. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4501 (Smith-
Hurd 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-4-1 (Burns 1973); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 144.341
(West Supp. 1979); MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 69-6101(a) (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 129.030 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-21.5(b) (Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10101 (Purdon 1977).
31. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.100 (Supp. 1979) (venereal disease); ALA. CODE
§ 104(17) (Supp. 1973) (venereal disease, drug dependency and pregnancy);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-363(d) (1976) (pregnancy); CAL CiV. CODE § 34.7 (Deer-
ing 1971) (contagious diseases); Id. §§ 25.9, 34.5, .7, .10 (Deering Supp. 1980)
(pregnancy, abortion, rape treatment, drug dependency, and mental health
care); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 113-22-102 (1973), 13-22-106 (Supp. 1979) (drug de-
pendency and rape treatment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-89a, -496c (West
1977) (drug dependency and venereal disease); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 708
(Supp. 1978) (pregnancy and contagious diseases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.065
(West Supp. 1980) (pregnancy); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-104.3 (1973) (venereal
disease); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 577-26, 577A-2 (Supp. 1979) (drug dependency
and pregnancy); JIL ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 4501 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (preg-
nancy); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-5-1 (Burns 1973) (venereal disease); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-123 (1973), §§ 65-2892, -2892a (1972) (pregnancy, venereal disease,
and drug dependency); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1095 (West 1977) (all in-
stances); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN.. § 333.5257 (Supp. 1979) (venereal disease);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.345 (West Supp. 1979) (pregnancy, venereal disease
1098 [Vol. 59:1093
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in these instances would create a risk that the minor might delay
or forego medical treatment.
3 2
If the parent can be located and the minor does not fall within
the statutory exceptions to the rule, the requirement of informed
consent coupled with the concept that a minor does not have the
capacity to consent, theoretically grants parents a veto power over
whether children will receive medical treatment. However, this
veto power is tempered by recognition of a state interest in pro-
tecting the welfare of the child which, in certain circumstances,
will override parental refusal to provide medical treatment. In
these instances the state, under the doctrine of parens patriae,33
and drug dependency); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(i), -13 (1972) (pregnancy
and venereal disease); Id. § 41-41-14 (Supp. 1979) (drug dependency); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 69-6101 (Supp. 1977) (venereal disease, pregnancy and
drug dependence); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1121 (Reissue 1976) (venereal dis-
ease); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 129.050, .060 (1975) (drug dependency and venereal
disease); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17A-1, -4 (West 1976) (drug dependency, preg-
nancy and venereal disease); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-34-9, -13 (1976) (venereal
disease and pregnancy); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.5(a) (Cure. Supp. 1977)
(pregnancy, venereal disease and drug dependency); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 10103 (Purdon 1977) (pregnancy and venereal disease); VA. CODE § 54-325,
2(D) (Supp. 1980) (pregnancy, drug dependency, mental health care and con-
tagious diseases).
These statutes have also been used to prevent parents from compelling
minors to receive medical treatment against their express wishes. See, e.g.,
In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) (minor had capacity to con-
sent to treatment for her pregnancy under state law and therefore parent
could not compel her to submit to an abortion).
Minors have also been emancipated by judicial decision in specific areas
of health care. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (consent of a
parent to a minor's abortion cannot be constitutionally required); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion); Kremens v. Bartley, 402
F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated as moot, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); Melville v.
Sabbatino, 30 Conn. Supp. 320, 313 A.2d 886 (1973) (right of minors to enter or
leave mental institutions despite objections of parents). But see Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (minor child may be involuntarily committed by par-
ents to a state mental institution).
32. HEALTH LAW CENTER, supra note 27, at 85.
33. Parens patriae has been defined as "a right of sovereignty [which] imposes a
duty on the sovereignty to protect the public interest and to protect such per-
sons with disabilities who have no rightful protector..., [It] extends to the
personal liberty of persons who are under a disability whether by reason of
infancy, incompetency .... " Note, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. REV. 654, 663
n.63 (1970) (quoting from Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 431, 111 &.2d 1, 5
(1955)). In State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475, 181 A.2d 751, 758, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962), the court described the parenspatriae power of the state
to be a sovereign right and duty to care for and to protect a child during his
minority from neglect, abuse and fraud.
For a discussion of the state's parens patriae authority encompassed in
the neglect statutes, see Areen, supra note 4, at 893; Thomas, supra note 4, at
313-28; Wald, supra note 4, at 989-90; Note, DE PAUL L REV., supra note 4, at
344-46; Note, SYRAcusE L. REV., supra note 4, at 84-85.
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may appoint a guardian ad litem34 for the child. When the state
intervenes in the parental decision-making process in this manner,
it acts not as an allocator of the decision-making responsibility, but
as the decision-maker itself.
35
The state's right to intervene in the decision-making process
stems from its police powers.3 6 Originally, the state's authority in
this area was enforced through the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions on parents.37 More recently, the state's authority to inter-
vene has been expanded and reinforced through the passage and
implementation of neglect statutes, 38 which define minimum pa-
rental duties and provide for judicial interference with parental
autonomy when the parent fails to fulfill these minimum responsi-
bilities.3 9 Most of these statutes allow judicial intervention in
34. A "guardian ad litem" is defined as "a guardian appointed by a court of jus-
tice to prosecute or defend for an infant in any suit to which he may be a
party." BLAcK's LAw DicToNARY 834 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
35. Bennett, supra note 4, at 294-307.
36. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 648.
37. Baker, supra note 4, at 297-98; Paulsen, supra note 4, at 690; Note, Unautho-
rized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860, 876
(1965).
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4 (Burns 1979) provides an example of a neglect
statute which imposes criminal sanctions on parents who fail to obtain
proper medical attention for their child:
(a) person having the care, custody, or control of a dependent who
knowingly or intentionally:
(1) Places the dependent in a situation that may endanger his
life or health;
(2) Abandons or cruelly confines the dependent;
(3) Deprives the dependent of necessary support; or
(4) Deprives the dependent of education as required by law;
commits neglect of a dependent, a class D felony.
Id.
For examples of convictions of parents under criminal neglect statutes for
failing to furnish medical treatment to children, see Eaglen v. State, 249 Ind.
144, 231 N.E.2d 147 (1967); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903);
Regina v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283. Parents have also been convicted of man-
slaughter for negligently causing the death of a child by failing to provide
medical care. See, e.g., State v. Stehr, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676, affid on re-
hearing, 94 Neb. 151, 142 N.W. 670 (1913). But see Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590,
155 A.2d 684 (1959) (insufficient evidence that gross negligence of the parents
was the proximate cause of the child's death from pneumonia).
38. See HEALTH LAw CENTER, supra note 27, at 85; Robertson, Involuntary Eutha-
nasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213, 222
(1975). Although common law did not recognize the denial of medical care to
children as an act of parental neglect, legislation now enables the judiciary to
transfer custody from the parents to a guardian ad litem to allow treatment
upon consent of the court-appointed guardian. For a good analysis of state
neglect laws, see Katz, supra note 5.
39. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 648-49. The use of minimal standards indicates our
society's strong presumption favoring parental autonomy and family privacy
over coercive state intervention. This policy of minimum state intervention
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health care decisions by imposing a duty on parents to provide a
minimum amount of medical care for minor children.4 0 However,
the process of defining the extent of this minimal duty and of de-
termining when the state should intervene has proceeded on a
case-by-case basis, with conflicting results among the many juris-
dictions which have confronted this issue.
4 1
Since only minimum standards of parental responsibility are
imposed for the medical treatment of minors, the right of state in-
tervention under the neglect statutes generally only arises when
the action or inaction of the parent threatens the child's life.42
Thus, immediacy of the danger to the child's life is a major factor
which a court considers in determining whether or not to inter-
vene. However, there are exceptions to this general rule.43 Other
factors, such as risks to the child's health, risks to the child's social
or psychological development, the maturity of the child, the child's
own desires, and the benefits and risks of treatment, also enter
into the decision-making process.44
EI. FACTS OF MINOR
On August 30, 1977, in Hastings, Nebraska, a twenty-month-old
child awoke with a fever of 1060. His parents brought him to a local
physician who referred the family to the University of Nebraska
Medical Center in Omaha. Doctors at the Medical Center discov-
ered that the child had acute lymphocytic leukemia, a disease
which is fatal if left untreated.
4 5
may reflect the law's inability to supervise interpersonal bonds and the diffi-
culty of providing an adequate parental substitute. Id. at 649-50. See text ac-
companying notes 108-09 infra.
40. See note 5 supra.
41. One commentator notes:
The law of child medical care decisionmaking builds on outmoded
constructs and contains elements often at war with one another. A
parent has a 'duty' to provide a child with medical care, but is 'free' to
withhold consent to it in cases where the care is obviously required.
Public intervention is easily accepted in cases where neither conta-
gion nor near universality of the medical problem would seem to re-
quire it but quite wrenching in others where the medical justification
is much stronger. Confusion abounds about the proper role of par-
ents' religious beliefs, the maturity of the child, the presence of a
threat to life and a host of other considerations.
Bennett, supra note 4, at 329.
42. G. ANNAS, supra note 19, at 87; Bennett, supra note 4, at 302; Note, supra note
22, at 1439.
43. See notes 12-14 & accompanying text supra.
44. HEALTH LAw CENTER, supra note 27, at 86.
45. Acute lymphocytic leukemia is considered to be the most common form of
childhood leukemia and the most curable. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § 1, at 29,
col. 2. This type of leukemia is characterized by excessive numbers of white
cells and abnormal cells in the lymph tissue. Symptoms include enlargement
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After being admitted to the University Medical Center, the
child began a program of intensive chemotherapy, which was to be
administered in three phases over a three-year period.46 This
treatment, which included the use of anti-leukemia drugs and cra-
nial radiation, would have given the child a better than fifty per-
cent chance for survival if he had completed this chemotherapy
program.4 7 On September 30, 1977, the doctors administered a
bone marrow test which indicated that the leukemia was in a state
of remission.
On October 8, 1977, the family moved to Massachusetts,48 where
the child was placed in the care of the Chief of the Pediatric
Hermatology Unit at Massachusetts General Hospital. The doctor
allowed the parents to supplement chemotherapy treatments with
a diet of distilled water, vegetarian foods, and high dosages of vita-
mins; however, the parents were informed that this diet would not
be an effective means of treating the boy's disease. The child re-
ceived injections at the hospital and the parents were instructed to
give the boy a daily oral dosage of an anti-leukemia drug. Al-
though the child developed some side effects from the medication,
these problems were corrected by adjusting the dosages of the
drugs.49 On November 10, 1977, the parents stopped giving the
of the lymph glands, internal bleeding, anemia, and a high susceptibility to
infection. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1056-57.
46. 379 N.E.2d at 1057. The first phase of chemotherapy treatment lasts for four
weeks and involves the use of a combination of several anti-leukemia drugs,
administered orally and by injection, to attack leukemia cells throughout the
body. The second phase of treatment involves the use of different drugs ad-
ministered over a six-week period. At this stage, cranial radiation is also
used and another drug is injected directly into the spinal fluid each week.
These latter two types of treatment attack leukemia cells which have mi-
grated into the spinal fluid, beyond the reach of the drugs administered intra-
venously. The third phase of treatment involves a weekly oral dosage of one
drug and a monthly injection of another over the remainder of the three year
period. Id.
47. Id. Medical studies indicate that approximately 50% of the children who fol-
low this procedure are still alive four years after beginning the treatment.
These studies also indicate that the survival rates vary according to the type
of leukemia cells found and the age of the child. Id.
48. Id. The parents were, by this time, averse to the use of cranial radiation. Id.
49. Id. at 1058. The court pointed out that, although certain side effects (tempo-
rary hair loss, numbness of the fingers and toes, back and joint pain, sleepi-
ness, headache, stiffness of the neck, and irritation of the tissues surrounding
the spinal cord) are common when chemotherapy is administered, the only
problems present in this case were stomach cramps and constipation. Id. at
1058 n.2. The parents also contended that the treatments produced behavi-
orial changes in the child, but the court did not consider these changes to be
linked to the chemotherapy treatments. Id. at 1058. 'The Greens contended
that chemotherapy had hurt Chad physically and mentally. They cited after-
effects of violence and pain and said that he had become 'terrified' of the
treatment." N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1978, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
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child his daily medication, without informing the child's attending
physician.50 However, they continued to take the child to the hos-
pital for his monthly visits. By the second week of November, the
child's leukemia was still in a state of remission and he entered the
third phase of treatment.
However, an examination on February 17, 1978, revealed that
the child's blood contained four percent leukemia cells. Upon
questioning the parents admitted that they had stopped adminis-
tering the oral medication more than three months before. The
doctor failed in his attempts to persuade the parents to resume the
child's treatment.5 1
On February 22, 1978, treatment was resumed pursuant to an
order of temporary guardianship by the probate court in response
to a petition brought by the child's attending physicians.5 2 How-
ever, the probate court granted the parents' motion to vacate this
temporary guardianship order, and the physicians appealed to the
superior court.
53
The superior court ordered a transfer of legal custody of the
50. On November 7, 1977, the parents asked Dr. Truman, the attending physician,
not to administer one of the regularly scheduled injections. The parents also
inquired as to what the results would be if chemotherapy were terminated.
Dr. Truman agreed to substitute an oral drug for the injection, but informed
the parents that there was a one hundred percent chance of relapse if chemo-
therapy was terminated at this time. 379 N.E.2d at 1058.
51. Id.
52. The petition was brought under a statute which provides:
The Boston juvenile court ... or the juvenile sessions of any dis-
trict court of the commonwealth.., upon the petition of any person
alleging on behalf of a child under the age of eighteen years within
the jurisdiction of said court that said child is without necessary and
proper physical ... care... and whose parents or guardian are un-
willing, incompetent or unavailable to provide such care, may issue a
precept to bring such child before said court, shall issue a notice to
the department, and shall issue summonses to both parents of the
child to show cause why the child should not be committed to the
custody of the department or other appropriate order made .... If,
after a recitation under oath by the petitioner of the facts of the con-
dition of the child who is the subject of the petition, the court is satis-
fied that there is reasonable cause to believe that the child is
suffering from serious abuse or neglect, or is in immediate danger of
serious abuse or neglect, and that immediate removal of the child is
necessary to protect the child from serious abuse or neglect, the
court may issue an emergency order transferring custody of a child
under this section to the department. . . . Said transfer of custody
shall be for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours. Upon the en-
try of the order a date for a hearing on the extension of the order
shall be set, which date shall fall within the seventy-two hour period.
MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (West Supp. 1980).
53. The parents' motion to vacate the temporary guardianship order was granted
on the ground that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the
issues raised by the parties. 379 N.E.2d at 1059. The supreme judicial court
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child from the parents to the Department of Public Welfare on
April 18, 1978.5 4 The parents' physical custody of the child was re-
stricted only to the extent necessary to ensure medical supervision
in accordance with the court order. On July 10, 1978, the supreme
judicial court affirmed this decision.
55
The parents began administering metabolic therapy56 to their
child in April, 1978, without informing the child's attending physi-
cian. When, in September, 1978, the doctor learned that the child
was receiving this treatment, he expressed concern that this form
of therapy could poison the boy.5 7 Although there was no immedi-
ate danger of acute poisoning, the parents were informed of the
possibility of chronic, long-term poisoning, and were advised to
discontinue these treatments.58
A hearing for a review and redetermination of the needs of the
child was held in the superior court in January, 1979.59 While the
parents accepted the necessity of continuing chemotherapy, they
noted that the probate court judge was in error in reaching this conclusion.
379 N.E.2d at 1059 n.3.
54. The superior court found that it had jurisdiction under MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (West Supp. 1980), as amended through St. 1977, ch. 799
(approved Dec. 6, 1977), and MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 26 (West Supp.
1980). For the text of statute, see note 59 infra. The court also found that it
had jurisdiction under MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 1 (West Supp. 1980),
inserted by 1973 Mass. Acts, ch. 1114, § 62, which grants the superior court
original jurisdiction in matters of equity. 379 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
55. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978).
56. This metabolic therapy included daily administrations of laetrile, vitamins,
enzyme enemas, and folic acid. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 840.
57. Id. Laetrile is a substance derived from the pits of apricots, peaches and bit-
ter almonds. Because the substance contains small amounts of cyanide, the
continued long-term use of laetrile can result in chronic cyanide poisoning,
resulting in possible damage to the brain, nervous system and body organs.
Id. at 840-42.
For a discussion on the legal status of laetrile, see Pendergast, The Judi-
cial Dilemma of Laetrile and a Possible Solution, 30 MERCER L. REV. 573
(1979); Comment, Laetrile: Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the
Regulation of Ineffective Drugs, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 233 (1978).
58. 393 N.E.2d at 840.
59. The right to petition the court for a rehearing and redetermination was exer-
cised under the following statute:
If the court finds the allegations in the petition proved within the
meaning of this chapter, it may adjudge that said child is in need of
care and protection and may commit the child to the custody of the
department until he becomes eighteen years of age or until in the
opinion of the department the object of his commitment has been
accomplished, whichever occurs first; or make any other appropriate
order with reference to the care and custody of the child as may con-
duce to his best interests, including but not limited to any one or
more of the following-
(1) It may permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian,
or other custodian, subject to conditions and limitations which the
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claimed the legal authority to supplement it with a program of met-
abolic therapy, and also sought an order granting them legal cus-
tody of the child.60 The court found that metabolic therapy had no
curative effect upon the child's disease, and posed serious risks of
harm.6 ' The parents were ordered to discontinue.metabolic ther-
apy and were denied legal custody of their son. The parents ap-
pealed to the supreme judicial court.62
On January 24, 1979, the family left Massachusetts to evade the
superior court's order to terminate metabolic therapy.63 Neverthe-
less, the supreme judicial court heard the appeal,64 and affirmed
court may prescribe including supervision as directed by the court
for the care and protection of the child.
(2) It may, subject to such conditions and limitations as it may
prescribe, transfer temporary legal custody to any of the following.-
(i) any individual who, after study by a probation officer or
other person or agency designated by the court, is found by the
court to be qualified to give care to the child;
(ii) any agency or other private organization licensed or
otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the
child;
(iii) the department of social services.
(3) It may order appropriate physical care including medical or den-
tal care.
In appropriate cases the court shall order the parents of said child to
reimburse the commonwealth or other agency for care.
On any petition filed in any court pursuant to this section, the depart-
ment, parents, person having legal custody of, or counsel for a child may
petition the court not more than once every six months for a review and
redetermination of the current needs of such child whose case has come
before the court.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 26 (West Supp. 1980).
60. 393 N.E.2d 838-39. At the time of this hearing, the child's disease had been in
remission ever since the court had originally ordered that treatment be re-
sumed. The chemotherapy treatment program was scheduled to last about
two more years. Id.
61. Laboratory tests confirmed that the child had low-grade cyanide poisoning
which was attributed to his daily ingestion of laetrile. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21,
1979, § 1, at 29, col. 2.
62. 393 N.E.2d at 837-38.
63. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1979, § 1, at 9, col. 2. The parents were found to be in
contempt of court as a result of their actions. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1979, § 4, at
9, col. 1. The authorities also considered charging the parents with kidnap-
ping, but this idea was subsequently abandoned. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1979,
§ 1, at 8, col. 6.
After leaving Massachusetts, the parents took the child to a clinic in Ti-
juana, Mexico, where metabolic therapy was continued. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1979, § 4, at 9, col. 1. In August of 1979, the parents had announced that the
child was cured of the disease. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1979, § 1, at 6, col 6. How-
ever, on October 12, 1979, the three-year-old boy died. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14,
1979, § 1, at 44, col. 3.
64. One justice dissented from the opinion of the court on the ground that the
appeal should have been dismissed becuase the parents had already left
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the decision of the superior court.65
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Minor Decisions
In the first appeal to the supreme judicial court,66 the parents
argued that the superior court's decision to remove legal custody
of their child in order to continue chemotherapy treatments vio-
lated their constitutional right to choose the type of medical treat-
ment appropriate for their child. The supreme judicial court held
that this issue was not properly before the court since the parents
had not attempted to prove the existence of an alternative medical
treatment, and had not asserted a right to choose between benefi-
cial treatments in the trial court.67 However, the court did address
the issue of whether a state may intervene when parents refuse to
administer the only type of treatment which the evidence has
shown could save their child's life. The court indicated that al-
though family autonomy is constitutionally protected, it is not ab-
solute. The state may limit parental rights in instances where
"parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of [their]
child."
68
The substantive issue before the court was whether the supe-
rior court had properly ordered the removal of legal custody from
Massachusetts with the child, in violation of the trial court's orders. 393
N.E.2d at 847 (Braucher, J., dissenting).
65. 393 N.E.2d at 846. The court found that the child's chances of being com-
pletely cured would have been approximately 80% if the parents had not ter-
minated chemotherapy and if the leukemia had remained in remission.
However, because the disease had returned in February of 1978, after the par-
ents had stopped administering the oral medication, the child's chances for
cure were close to 50%. Id. at 839-40.
66. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978).
67. Id. at 1056 n.1. The parents also attacked the court's order on the procedural
grounds that: (1) the issue of their fitness as parents was res judicata, since it
had been previously decided in their favor by the probate court; (2) the supe-
rior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (3) the parents received inade-
quate notice of the superior court proceedings; and (4) the trial de novo in the
superior court exposed the parents to double jeopardy. Id. at 1056. The
supreme court judicial court first decided that the probate court had not dis-
missed the case on the merits but, instead, on the incorrect conclusion that it
lacked the jurisdiction to consider the questions raised. Therefore, the
supreme judicial court, like the superior court, held that the probate court
order should not be given res judicata effect. Id. at 1059. The court also found
that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, and that the notice of
the superior court was adequate. Id. at 1059-61. Finally, the supreme judicial
court held that the trial de novo in the superior court had not unconstitution-
ally exposed the parents to double jeopardy, since the proceedings were civil
rather than criminal in nature. Id. at 1061.
68. Id. at 1056 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972)).
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the parents so that chemotherapy treatments could be continued.
The court considered three competing interests: (1) the personal
needs of the child; (2) the natural rights of parents; and (3) the
responsibilities of the state.69 It held that the rights of the parents
had been properly limited, and that state intervention under the
neglect statute70 was justified in this case because the chemother-
apy treatments were necessary to save the child's life. According
to expert testimony, the child would die without treatment,7 1 and
chemotherapy offered him a substantial chance for cure.
7 2
Almost a year later, the supreme judicial court was faced with a
different issue when it reviewed the decision on the parents' peti-
tion for redetermination of the need for state care and protection
of their child.73 The parents had alleged the existence of an alter-
native or supplemental medical treatment, and had asserted their
rights in the superior court to choose between medical alterna-
tives. Thus, the supreme judicial court was confronted with deter-
mining the extent of parental rights to choose the type of medical
treatment their child should receive.7 4
The superior court had ordered the parents to cease adminis-
tering the alternative metabolic therapy, and had ordered that
chemotherapy treatments were to be continued. The supreme ju-
dicial court affirmed this decision because there was no evidence
that the parents' proposed alternative treatment had any curative
effects on the child's disease. In addition, the court found that the
alternative treatment was actually harming the child and that con-
tinued chemotherapy treatments offered the child a substantial
chance for a cure and a normal life.
75
B. The Interests of the Parties
1. The Child's Interests
The legal responsibility for decisions concerning the medical
care of children is shared by children, parents, and the state.7 6 The
Minor court emphasized that among these three competing inter-
69. 379 N.E.2d at 1061-67. For a discussion of these considerations, see text ac-
companying notes 76-117 infra.
70. For text of the statute, see note 52 supra.
71. 379 N.E.2d at 1063.
72. Id. at 1056. For a discussion of the "substantial chance for cure" test, see
§ IV-C of the text infra.
73. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979).
74. See generally § IV-D of text infra.
75. 393 N.E.2d at 839-43.
76. Bennett, supra note 4, at 285. The responsibility and interests of physicians
in the decision-making process is also recognized. HEALTH LAw CENTER,
supra note 27, at 85.
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ests, the paramount interest is that of the child.77 In determining
the best interests of the child, the court applied a "substituted
judgment" test, which had previously been used to ascertain the
interests of an incompetent adult.78 Under this test the court at-
tempts to identify the actual values and preferences of the person
who, due to minority or mental incompetency, is incapable of ex-
pressing his own desires. Through the application of the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine, the court seeks to recognize the "free
choice and moral dignity of the incompetent person. .... ,,79
The court found that the substituted judgment doctrine was
consistent with the "best interests of the child" test, which is the
test most commonly applied in determining whether a state should
intervene and the nature of the state intervention under the neg-
lect statutes.80 The court recognized that the best interests of the
child is basically an objective test under which decisions are made
"in behalf of" the child. In contrast, the substituted judgment test
is an attempt by the court to "don the mantle" of the other per-
son.81 Nevertheless, the court found that the "criteria to be ex-
amined and the basic applicable reasoning are the same,"
regardless of which test was applied.
82
The court indicated that the child's interest in favor of continu-
ing chemotherapy was the opportunity for a longer life and a "sub-
stantial chance for cure.183 This interest was particularly acute
because the chances for successful treatment were enhanced due
to the type of leukemia involved and the age of the child.84 An-
other important consideration in determining the best interests of
the child was that there was no effective alternative to chemother-
apy in the treatment of the child's disease.
The two factors weighing against chemotherapy were the possi-
bility that more serious side effects could develop in the future,
and the child's inability to understand the significance of treat-
ment.85 Although there were minor side effects associated with
the proposed treatment, the evidence established that chemother-
77. The court stated that "where a child's well-being is placed in issue, it is not
the rights of parents that are chiefly to be considered. The first and para-
mount duty is to consult the welfare of the child." 393 N.E.2d at 843.
78. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
79. 379 N.E.2d at 1065.
80. A. FREUD, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 4 (1973).
81. 379 N.E.2d at 1065 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977)).
82. 379 N.E.2d at 1065.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1057.
85. Id. at 1066.
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apy would not cause permanent physical harm.86 Therefore, the
potential for future adverse effects of chemotherapy was out-
weighed by the harm which would result from nontreatment of the
disease-almost certainly the child's death.
The importance of the inability of an incompetent to under-
stand the significance of undergoing painful chemotherapy was ex-
amined in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz. 87 Although Saikewicz dealt with an incompetent who
was unable to give "informed consent" to the continuance of medi-
cal treatment due to mental retardation rather than minority, the
decision indicates that inability to understand and cooperate with
medical treatment may be an important factor in determining the
interests of an incompetent in the continuation of a particular form
of medical treatment.
Joseph Saikewicz was a severely retarded, sixty-seven year old
man, who was suffering from acute myeloblastic monocytic leuke-
mia. The superintendent of the state school where Saikewicz lived
as a ward of the state filed a petition for the appointment of a
guardian to make the necessary decisions about his care and treat-
ment. Both the appointed guardian and the attending physicians
recommended against further chemotherapy.
The court, while recognizing that most people in similar circum-
stances would choose to continue treatments, ordered the discon-
tinuance of chemotherapy. A significant factor in this decision was
that, although treatment offered Mr. Saikewicz a substantial
chance for remission of the disease, his illness was incurable.
Therefore, his inability to understand the treatment and the ad-
verse side effects accompanying the chemotherapy outweighed his
interest in a brief prolongation of his life.88
Like Mr. Saikewicz, the child in Minor was unable to under-
stand the significance of the chemotherapy treatments. However,
unlike Mr. Saikewicz, the child had a potentially curable disease.
The interest in treatment in Minor was, therefore, great enough to
outweigh the child's interest in being free from the adverse side
effects of treatment.8 9
2. The Parents' Interests
Although the court in Minor emphasized that the paramount
interest in the determination of whether the minor should con-
tinue to receive chemotherapy treatments is the welfare of the
86. Id. at 1065-66.
87. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
88. Id. at 754, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
89. 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
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child,90 the court also considered the parental interests. The court
recognized that the parents have an interest in parental autonomy,
or the "natural rights" of parents to make decisions touching on
the welfare of their minor children.91
The natural rights of parents have been protected by the courts
from unwarranted state intervention.92 Parental autonomy has
even been upheld in instances where there is a possibility, or even
a likelihood, that the parental decision may eventually result in a
permanent handicap for the child.93 However, there has also been
a recognition that parental rights may be limited by the state
where parental decisions may jeopardize the health or safety of
the child.
94
While the law recognizes the parental interest in autonomy,
"[p]arental rights . . .do not clothe parents with life and death
authority over their children. ' 95 The nature of the relationship is
not an absolute property right of the parent in the child; instead, it
90. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 843.
91. 379 N.E.2d at 1062. The parents of Karen Ann Quinlan also argued for "family
autonomy" in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See UNIVERsrrY
PUBLICATIONS OF AMERICA, IN THE MATTER OF KAREN QUINLAN VOL 11: THE
COMPLETE BRIEFS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND OPINION IN THE NEW JERSEY
SUPREME COURT 19-22 (1976).
92. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (the Court held that state
interest was insufficient to force Amish parents to send their children to the
public schools after the eighth grade); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(Court held that state law which forbade the teaching of foreign languages to
young children was invalid).
In Yoder, the Court stated: "The history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbring-
ing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition." 406 U.S. at 232.
93. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas
argued that the parental decision to terminate the public school education of
Amish children after the eighth grade could handicap the children in later
life.
For instances where courts refused to intervene in parental decisions not
to treat their children, although the children suffered physical and emotional
handicaps as a result of nontreatment, see In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127
N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972) (remanding to
trial court), a'g trial court decision on remand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279
(1973); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
94. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court in Prince
upheld a conviction of a parent for violating child labor laws by allowing her
children to distribute religious pamphlets on public streets. The Court
stated: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their chil-
dren before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170.
95. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063. However, one author points out that
"the requisite of parental consent to medical care for children becomes
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is a right in the nature of a trust, which requires the parent to fulfill
a duty to care for and protect the child throughout his minority.96
If the parent fails in this duty, the state may intervene and termi-
nate parental rights.
9 7
An individual's right to personal privacy encompasses the right
to refuse medical treatment.9 8 Therefore, the courts have gener-
ally upheld the right of adults to refuse medical treatment, even
when the treatment is necessary to sustain life,9 9 as long as the
adult is found competent 0 0 However, if the adult is legally inca-
pable of refusing medical treatment due to unconciousness or
mental incompetency, the courts are unwilling to allow others to
meaningless if refusal to consent automatically triggers state inquiry or a
finding of neglect." Goldstein, supra note 4, at 651.
96. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 843. One commentator notes that problems
may result from the notion that parents are the trustees of their children.
Wald, supra note 4, at 991-93. Blackstone commented:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their chil-
dren, is a principle of natural law; an obligation, ... laid on them not
only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them
into the world for they would be in the highest manner injurious to
their issue, if they only gave their children life that they might after-
wards see them perish. By begetting them, therefore, they have en-
tered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, as far as in them lies,
that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and pre-
served. And thus the children will have the perfect right of receiving
maintenance from the parents.
1 W. BLACKSTONE CoImamENTARIEs *447.
97. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 843.
98. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bod-
ily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L REV. 228, 239-42
(1973). See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
99. See Note, supra note 33, at 662-67. In the following cases, the right of an adult
to refuse a blood transfusion on religious principles was upheld: Holmes v.
Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d
372 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Mll. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435
(1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962). Contra In
re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Powell v. Columbian Presbyterian Medical
Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1965). In the latter two cases, the
adult who objected to treatment was the parent of a minor child. See also
Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), where
the court held that an adult female who was given medication at a psychiatric
hospital over her religious objections had standing to assert a violation of her
civil rights.
In the following two cases, the patients' objections to medical treatment
were not based upon religious beliefs: Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (elderly woman was held to have a right to refuse am-
putation of a gangreneous foot); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (patient held to have right to refuse further use of artificial
respirator).
100. Sharpe & Hargest, supra note 9, at 696-97.
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make that choice for him,101 except in instances where the treat-
ment offers no hope for recovery.
0 2
In Minor, the court rejected the parents' attempt to compare
the fundamental right of competent adults to make personal deci-
sions about health care with the rights of parents to make these
decisions for their children. 103 The court held that the parents
could not assert on their own behalf the privacy rights of their mi-
nor child; the child's privacy rights are protected by the application
of the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interests of the
child test.104 Therefore, there is a marked difference in the willing-
ness of the state to intervene in medical decisions concerning
adults, and its willingness to intervene in those concerning chil-
dren. Whereas a state generally cannot impose treatment on a
competent adult concerning his own body without violating his
right of privacy, 0 5 the state has the power to impose treatment on
an adult parent concerning his child's body.
106
The Minor court also examined the parents' interests in
preventing further discomfort to their child which could result
from the continuation of chemotherapy treatments. 0 7 The court
considered the side effects which the child suffered as a result of
the treatments and found them to be minor in nature. 108 The par-
ents, however, asserted that the side effects were detrimental to
the child's physical and mental welfare.109 They claimed an inter-
est in having their child free from pain and suffering, and in ensur-
ing a healthy family relationship during the remainder of their
child's life. The mother in this case commented: "We would love
for [our child] to have a full and long life. But it is more important
to us that his life be full instead of long, if that [is] the way it [has]
to be."110
The Minor court did not discuss the harmful effects that the
continued treatment of the child might have on the parents.
Among these are stress on family relationships and emotional
101. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971); Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc. 2d 662, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1964).
102. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616,273
N.Y.S.2d 624 (1966).
103. 393 N.E.2d at 844.
104. Id.
105. See notes 99-100 & accompanying text supra.
106. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 653. See notes 6-8 & accompanying text supra.
107. 379 N.E.2d at 1064.
108. Id. at 1058.
109. The father stated to the press that "Chad becomes restless and violent after
treatments. He's like a wild animal." N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1978, § 1, at 18, col. 1.
110. 379 N.E.2d at 1064.
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strains on the parents resulting from the child's discomfort and the
related medical expenses."1  However, the court may have
reached the same result even if the emotional effects on the par-
ents had been given full consideration since there was a lack of
evidence that the child suffered from severe side effects from the
chemotherapy treatment.
Nevertheless, the Minor court should have examined these fac-
tors in their decision. It should be recognized that the best inter-
ests of the child may be tied invariably to the interests and desires
of his parents, and that potential emotional strains on parents re-
sulting from certain types of medical treatments have a bearing on
which alternative furthers the best interest of the child. Therefore,
it may be impossible for a court to interfere with a family relation-
ship and parental decisions and interests without indirectly harm-
ing the child. As one author suggests, in arguing for parental
autonomy in this area, "[t]he law is too crude an instrument to
nurture, as only parents can, the delicate physical, psychological,
and social tissues of a child's life.""
2
3. The State's Interests
Three state interests were indentified by the Minor court: (1)
protection of the welfare of children living within the state's bor-
ders, (2) the preservation of life, and (3) the protection of the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical profession.113 In regard to the first
interest, the court decided that because the child's life was
threatened by the parental decision to refuse continued medical
treatment, the state's interest in protecting the child's welfare su-
perseded parental autonomy." 4 In examining the state's interest
in the preservation of life, the court distinguished the child's cir-
cumstances from the incompetent's situation in Saikewicz. The
Minor court noted that chemotherapy treatment "offers the child
his only real chance of survival,"' 5 whereas in Saikewicz the
treatment would only afford a possibility of prolonging life for a
brief period. "[T] here is a substantial distinction in the State's in-
sistence that human life be saved where the affliction is curable,
111. One author urges that if society insists that children receive medical treat-
ment and the parents do not agree, society should have to bear the resulting
financial, physical and psychological costs for "making real for the child 'it
saves' the value it prefers." Goldstein, supra note 4, at 657. The possibility of
strains on the family relationship as a result of medical neglect proceedings
has been noted elsewhere. Bennett, supra note 4, at 319.
112. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 657.
113. 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
114. Id. The commentators agree: see Baker, supra note 4, at 296; Goldstein,
supra note 4, at 650; Note, supra note 22, at 1439.
115. 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
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* . . [and] the State interest where ... the issue is not whether, but
when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual that life may
be briefly extended.""
6
The court focused on the medical profession's interest in curing
the curable in discussing the state interest in protecting the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. Unlike what the treatment in
Saikewicz offered the adult incompetent, the proposed chemother-
apy offered more to the child than a brief prolongation of life. The
treatment offered a "substantial chance for cure." Therefore, the
court in Minor found that this state interest also required that the
chemotherapy be administered to the child."
7
4. Balancing The Interests
A major problem confronting the legal system when the issue is
raised as to whether a court should intervene in parental medical
decision-making is how to balance the competing interests of the
child, the parents, and the state so as to maximize the autonomy of
the family unit while still protecting the welfare of the child. The
Minor decision, while reflecting a concern for parental interests,
emphasizes that when a child's well-being is placed in issue paren-
tal interests are secondary to those of the child.ln 8
In order to protect the maintenance of the family unit, the law
116. Id. (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26).
117. 379 N.E.2d at 1067. One commentator has suggested that the ethical duty of
the medical profession would require the adminstration of treatment under
circumstances similar to those in the Minor case. Because it was found that
chemotherapy would afford a substantial chance of curing the child's disease,
this type of treatment would be considered to be an "ordinary" means of care:
Despite the existence of the duty in the doctor to preserve the life
of his patient, he is not under an obligation to use every conceivable
means to do so. Catholic theologians express the point in the distinc-
tion they draw between ordinary and extraordinary means. Doctors
are under an obligation to use the first but not the second. Ordinary
means have been described as 'all medicines, treatments and opera-
tions which offer a reasonable hope of benefit, and which can be ob-
tained and used without excessive expense, pain or other
inconvenience.' Extraordinary means are those which do involve
these factors, or which if used would not offer a reasonable hope of
benefit.
N. ST. JOHN-STEvAs, LAw AND MoRALs 53 (1964).
118. 379 N.E.2d at 1063. One commentator stresses that the child's interest should
always be considered before the interest of the parent in determining
whether medical treatment should be ordered, because it is the child and not
the parent who suffers from a lack of medical care, and because it is the
child's interests and future that are primarily affected by the court's decision.
Note, supra note 22, at 1438.
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imposes a policy of minimum state intervention." 9 The minimum
standards required of parents by the neglect statutes impose on
the state the burden of overcoming the presumption of parental
autonomy. 120 "The presumption of parental capacity to decide is
meant to hold in check judges or doctors who may be tempted to
use the power of the state to impose their personal preferences,
their 'adult parental' judgments upon parents whose own adult
judgments may give greater weight to another preference."' 21
One commentator has identified five factors governing the judi-
cial determination of whether the state can order medical care for
a minor child when the parents have refused treatment. These cri-
teria include: (1) the danger to the life and limb of the child posed
by non-treatment; (2) the degree of danger involved in the treat-
ment; (3) the chances of improvement from the treatment; (4) the
cooperation of the child; and (5) the burden to the community in
permitting the condition to continue.122 Other authors have taken
a more subjective view of the appropriate criteria for state inter-
vention, focusing on such factors as short-term pain or discomfort
associated with the proposed treatment and long-term, non-health
consequences of state intervention in a particular case. 123 Another
important factor appears to be the extent to which the medical pro-
fession is in agreement about what medical treatment is appropri-
ate for the child.124
In balancing the interests of parent, state and child, the Minor
court stressed that the parental interest in autonomy generally
outweighs the other interests if the child's condition is not life-
threatening or if the proposed treatment presents great risks to the
welfare of the child. 125 Yet, the court found that in this case the
119. See In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 674, 126 P.2d 765, 775-76 (1942) where the
court stated:
The authorities are uniform that the maintenance of the natural
family relations is favored and the parental affection is not only enti-
tled to consideration as constituting a strong claim in behalf of the
parents but as an element of priceless advantage to the infant when
the question of custody of a child is to be determined; and the par-
ents will therefore be preferred as guardians if they are fit for the
trust.
120. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 654.
121. Id. at 664.
122. Note, SYRACUSE L. REv., supra note 4, at 89-90.
123. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 4, at 311.
124. See id.; Goldstein, supra note 4, at 652.
125. 379 N.E.2d at 1062. The commentators are generally in agreement that the
right of state intervention should overcome the presumption in favor of pa-
rental autonomy only where the parent refuses medical treatment when the
child's condition is very serious, see Bennett, supra note 4, at 330, or where
the child's life is threatened, see Goldstein, supra note 4, at 664. But see Note,
supra note 22, at 1440, where the author argues that the interests of the child
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child's interests were paramount since the child would die within a
few months without treatment, and since the proposed chemother-
apy treatments did not pose great risks of harm to the child. 26 The
treatment offered the child the great benefit of extended life and a
possible cure. Although side effects of chemotherapy could be det-
rimental to the child in the short run, the weight of this factor
against treatment was overcome by the child's long-term interest
in life.
The court found that the state interest in protecting the welfare
of the child superseded parental perogatives, since the parental re-
fusal to treat the child's disease threatened the child's chances for
continued life. The court also decided that the state interest in the
preservation of life weighed strongly in favor of continued treat-
ment, although it was noted that this interest will not invariably
supersede other interests in all circumstances. 27
In reference to whether the parents' proposed alternative treat-
ment of metabolic therapy should be administered to the child, it
was decided that the interests of the child and of the state should
overcome parental prerogatives in the decision-making process.
The parents argued that metabolic therapy would help to ease the
side effects of chemotherapy treatment and would help to cure the
child's disease. However, the court found that there was no relia-
ble evidence that metabolic therapy would either help to cure the
child's disease or ease the effects of chemotherapy. The positive
placebo effect, often associated with metabolic therapy, would be
nonexistent in the case of a three-year-old child. Furthermore, the
proposed alternative therapy posed substantial dangers to the
child's health and well-being. 128 In balancing parental rights to de-
termine which treatment to give their child against the state's in-
terests in protecting the child's welfare, the court stated:
Under our free and constitutional government, it is only under serious
provocation that we permit interference by the state with parental rights.
and the state may be just as strong when the child's condition is not life-
threatening, because the injury to the child's right is only different in degree
and not in kind.
126. 379 N.E.2d at 1063.
127. Id. at 1066 n.12.
128. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 844-45. The court noted that the use of lae-
trile posed several dangers to the child's health: (1) because laetrile is not
approved by the FDA, the quality obtainable in the United States is poor and
is often contaminated; (2) laetrile could possibly compromise the effective-
ness of chemotherapy treatments; and (3) laetrile could result in chronic cya-
nide poisoning. Id. There was also evidence that the excessive dosages of
vitamin A being administered to the child could cause liver and central ner-
vous system damage, the enzyme enemas could result in bacterial infection,
the folic acid could interfere with the effectiveness of the anti-leukemia
drugs, and that the vitamin C could cause kidney damage. Id.
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That provocation is clear here. It is beyond argument that a drug or
course of treatment is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or physical
injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit. The position of
the parents in this case, however well-intentioned, is indefensible against
the overwhelming weight of medical evidence.
1 2 9
The supreme judicial court in Minor recognized that all of the
parties to the decision-making process have competing interests in
the outcome. 130 Moreover, the court expressly recognized in the
first appeal of Minor that the parents, in refusing to consent to fur-
ther chemotherapy treatments for their child, did not wish their
child harm;131 in fact, the court found that the parents "Wanted
what was best for him.' 32 Therefore, it is evident that the conflict
in the case did not center on conflicting objectives of the parties,
but on the means to achieve the common objective of promoting
the child's best interests.
Unlike other proceedings where state intervention is justified
under the neglect statutes, intervention to ensure proper medical
care is often not founded on a lack of parental concern for the
child, but, instead, on a difference of opinion as to the proper
means of dealing with a physical problem. The parents may be
acting in the belief that their decision to refuse medical care for
their child is in the child's best interests. The parents may also be
suffering from emotional stress as a product of the daily struggle to
cope with an ailing, physically handicapped, or dying child. There-
fore, from a parent's perspective state intervention in this type of
situation, and the resulting adversary process, may appear particu-
larly offensive and less justified than in other neglect proceedings
where there has often already been a breakdown in the family re-
lationship.
Furthermore, court intervention in the family relationship in or-
der to ensure proper medical care for a minor child potentially in-
volves serious and prolonged problems of court supervision over
the enforcement of its decision. Because of parental love and deep
concern for the child, physical removal of the child from their cus-
tody may be not only unwarranted, but also extremely detrimental
to the child's emotional well-being.133 On the other hand, if the
child remains in the physical custody of his parents, there are po-
tential problems of state reliance on parental cooperation to en-
sure that the treatment proceeds in accordance with the best
interests of the child's physical health.134 Since parents may feel
129. Id. at 846.
130. Id. at 843-44.
131. 379 N.E.2d at 1064.
132. Id.
133. Wald, supra note 4, at 993-96.
134. Id. at 1030-31.
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justified in having made their decision against treatment, parental
cooperation with the treatment program may be particularly diffi-
cult to achieve.
Minor involved serious and prolonged problems of court super-
vision over the enforcement of its decision. Unlike situations
where operations could be ordered or blood transfusions given im-
mediately, the treatment in this case was required to extend over
several years. 135 Either prolonged and continuous parental coop-
eration with the court order or the removal of physical custody of
the child from the parents was required to insure treatment. Be-
cause the parents had a beneficial relationship with their child, re-
moval from their physical custody would have been detrimental to
the child's emotional well-being. On the other hand, the problems
of enforcing state-ordered treatment when the child remains in the
physical custody of the parents are tragically illustrated by the pa-
rental response to the court's decision in Minor,136 which resulted
in the inability of the state to protect the child's physical well-be-
ing.
Future medical advances may have a substantial impact on the
court's application of the various criteria in determining whether
to order medical treatment for a minor child in a particular case.
The more certain a cure becomes, the more substantial becomes
the state's interest in ensuring that the child receives that treat-
ment. In areas of health-care where the medical judgments con-
cerning the treatment of a particular ailment become less
controversial, the parental interest in making the decision is less-
ened, and correspondingly, the case for public intervention be-
comes stronger.
137
Moreover, if medical technology is capable of reducing the ad-
verse effects of a treatment, the courts may be more willing to find
that treatment is in the child's best interests. For example, the Mi-
nor court discussed the fact that although the child's parents com-
plained of adverse effects of the chemotherapy treatments, the
severity of the side effects was reduced by adjustments in the med-
ication. 3 8 In contrast, it was the adverse effects of the treatment
in Saikewicz which led the court to conclude that it was in the pa-
tient's best interests to terminate the treatment. 13 9 Thus, the cases
seem to indicate that if medical technology can eliminate or
counteract the adverse effects of a proposed treatment, the inter-
ests of the patient may require treatment in more cases.
135. 379 N.E.2d at 1057.
136. See note 63 & accompanying text supra.
137. Bennett, supra note 4, at 318.
138. 379 N.E.2d at 1058.
139. 373 Mass. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
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Advancements in medical technology may tip the balance of the
interests in favor of state intervention and against parental auton-
omy in future instances where a parent has refused medical treat-
ment for his minor child. On the other hand, the more treatment
alternatives available, the less substantial becomes the state's in-
terest in forcing the parents to use a particular mode of treatment
if another is recognized by a portion of the medical community as
being effective against the child's disease.
Medical advances will also alter the meaning of "neglect" under
the statutes. As the medical profession improves its ability to
cure, societal expectations of what constitutes reasonable care on
the part of parents may also increase.140 For example, in 1945 half
of the children who developed acute lymphocytic leukemia died
within two to four months. 14 1 The chances for survival have been
greatly increased since that time due to advances in treatment
techniques.' 42 As the Minor decision illustrates, the responsibili-
ties of parents toward children who have been afflicted with this
disease have expanded accordingly. This expansion of the mean-
ing of "neglect" under the statutes has also increased the power of
the state to intervene in the health care field.
C. The Substantial Chance for Cure Test
In Minor the results of the proposed treatment, as opposed to
those of non-treatment, were not clear-cut. 143 The court was con-
fronted with a strong possibility of death for the child, regardless
of which option it chose to follow. The choice was therefore not
between life and death for the minor, but, rather, between almost
certain death without treatment, and a "substantial chance for
cure" if chemotherapy were continued.
In applying this "substantial chance for cure" test, the court did
not depart from a balancing of the interests; instead, the test
merely aided the court in weighing the interests of the parties.
The Minor decision established that where the evidence demon-
strates that the treatment affords the child a "substantial chance
for cure" of a life-threatening illness, the child's interests in the
possibility of life will supersede the parents' interests in auton-
omy. While not defining what constitutes a "substantial chance"
under this test, the court indicated that even when a treatment of-
fers less than a fifty percent chance for cure, it is preferable to no
140. See Regina v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25
N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941).
141. Karon, A Strategy for Further Advances in Treatment for Childhood Leuke-
mia, in CANCER CHEMOTHERAPY 191 (1975).
142. Id.
143. 379 N.E. 2d at 1057.
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treatment at all, and justifies state interference over parental ob-
jections.'4
In Massachusetts, the "substantial chance for cure" test had
previously been applied in Saikewicz, where the court found that
chemotherapy treatments might prolong the patient's life but that
there was no substantial chance for cure.145 The Minor court dis-
tinguished Saikewicz by stating that in the child's case,
[c] hemotherapy was more than a brief means of prolonging life-it offered
the child a substantial hope for cure. To withdraw the child from his
chemotherapy program, without offering an effective alternative, would be
tantamount to treating him 'as if he were dying.' According to the child's
attending physician, this emphatically was not the case.
14 6
Although the "substantial hope for cure" language has not been
expressly employed in other jurisdictions, the concept has been
widely utilized in determining the justification of state interven-
tion to order medical treatment for an incompetent adult.147 It is
recognized that the feasibility of cure is an important factor to be
considered because it is helpful in estimating the value of a pro-
posed treatment to an individual patient. The concept that the
state should not intervene to force treatment on an incompetent
where a cure is impossible has received widespread acceptance. 148
The notion of the substantial chance for cure has also been em-
ployed in distinguishing between "extraordinary" and "ordinary"
care. 4 9 The Minor court emphasized that the chemotherapy treat-
ment ordered for the child was ordinary medical care in the view of
the medical profession. 5 0
The use of expert testimony and statistics was vital in the
court's determination that there was a substantial chance for cure
144. 393 N.E.2d at 840.
145. 373 Mass. at 734, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
146. 379 N.E.2d at 1067.
147. See, e.g., In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1966). The court in
Nemser denied a petition for an order directing the amputation of the leg of
an eighty-year-old patient who had a gangrene condition due to diabetes.
The court based its decision not to order the amputation on the ground that
the evidence demonstrated uncertainty as to whether amputation would pro-
long the patient's life or correct her condition. See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). The Quinlan court allowed life-support measures to
be terminated when the incompetent had no chance of ever returning to a
"cognizant sapient state". Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
148. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct.
1978); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Nemser, 51 Misc. 2d
616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1966). See also J. GOULD & L CRAIGMYLE, YouR DEATH
WARRANT? THE IMPLICATIONS OF EUTHANASA-A MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHI-
CAL STUDY 70-80 (1971); Goldstein, supra note 4, at 649; Robertson, supra note
38, at 214-15.
149. See N. ST. JoHN-STEvAs, supra note 117.
150. 379 N.E.2d at 1064.
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in the Minor case. The court's use of statistical evidence reflects a
recognition that it is always difficult to ascertain with absolute cer-
tainty the outcome of any medical treatment. In In re Vasko,151
the New York Appellate Division also used probability data to pre-
dict possible results of the proposed medical treatment of a child
who was suffering from an eye tumor.152 Despite the uncertainty
as to the possibility of cure, the court, over parental objections, or-
dered an operation to be performed to remove the eye, noting that
"[m] edicine and surgery are not exact sciences, and the result of
an operation may not be foretold with accuracy .... ,,1"3 However,
in the case of In re Sampson,5 4 medical treatment was ordered for
a minor, over parental objections, even though expert testimony
indicated that there was no chance for a cure of the child's dis-
ease. 1
55
Because of the uncertainty of the possibility of cure in Minor,
the substantial chance for cure test represents an expansion of ju-
dicial authority to intervene under the neglect statutes in order to
authorize medical treatment over parental objections. Although
this test does not represent a marked departure from previous con-
siderations in the decision-making process, it affords greater pos-
sibilities for legally justifying state intervention where the results
of treatment are speculative. However, because the concept of a
"substantial chance" has not been defined with precision, it is diffi-
cult to evaluate just how low the "odds" must be before state inter-
vention would be unwarranted under this test. 56 The experts in
Minor were unable to evaluate with precision just what were the
child's chances for a cure. However, the court noted that only a
short while ago available treatments for the child's condition may
not have afforded him a substantial chance for cure. 157 As medical
151. 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933).
152. The Vasko court found that there was a fifty percent chance for cure with
treatment. Id. at 131, 263 N.Y.S. at 555.
153. Id. at 131, 263 N.Y.S. at 555.
154. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. 1970), aOd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323
N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), af'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900,278 N.E.2d 918,328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
155. 65 Misc. 2d at 661, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 645. The child in Sampson suffered from
Von Recklinghausen's disease, which had caused a massive deformity of his
face and neck. Medical treatment was ordered over parental objections in
this case because there was evidence that surgery would improve the child's
physical appearance, thereby benefiting his psychological well-being. 65
Misc. 2d at 660, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45. However, the Sampson decision has
been sharply criticized. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 667.
156. Goldstein argues that there should be no coercive intrusion by the state in a
life or death situation if there is a less than high probability that the treat-
ment will cure the child or enable him to have a life of normal healthy growth
toward adulthood. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 653.
157. 379 N.E.2d at 1063-64. See also notes 141-42 & accompanying text supra.
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knowledge in this area of study improves, the courts may be able
to define a "substantial chance" with more precision.
It is also interesting to speculate as to what effect the finding
that a treatment offers a substantial chance for cure may have
where parental objections to medical treatment are based upon re-
ligious convictions. While the parents did not raise this issue in
Minor, it is apparent that a finding of a substantial chance for cure
of a life-threatening illness may even overcome parental objections
based on religious grounds.
158
D. The Alternative Medical Treatment Test
Another important factor in the decision of whether to allow
parents to refuse medical treatment for their minor child is the de-
termination of whether there are alternative treatments available
which would be effective against the child's disease or injury.15 9
When a life-threatening disease is involved, the existence of an ef-
fective alternative may be crucial to the preservation of parental
autonomy. However, if the condition is not perceived by the court
as being a threat to the child's life, the absence of an alternative
treatment will not necessarily result in state-enforced treat-
ment.160
An important element in the court's decision in Minor was the
absence of any effective alternatives to the chemotherapy treat-
ment. In the original hearing before the supreme judicial court,
the parents argued that chemotherapy should not be given to their
child over their objections, regardless of whether an alternative
treatment was available. However, in the review and redetermina-
tion hearing the parents argued that, while they accepted the ne-
cessity of chemotherapy treatments for their child, they desired to
supplement these treatments with an alternative program of meta-
bolic therapy.
In determining whether to allow this supplemental treatment,
the court asked whether this treatment was "consistent with good
158. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), afl'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People v. Labrenz, 411 M11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston,
58 N.J. 576, 279 A. 2d 670 (1971); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A. 2d 751,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d
641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), af'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aft'd, 29
N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
159. Bennett, supra note 4, at 311; Goldstein, supra note 4, at 653. See also State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 479-80, 181 A.2d 751, 760 (1962).
160. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). Another important factor
in Hudson was that the proposed operation to correct a congenital deformity
was a dangerous procedure. Id. at 677, 126 P.2d at 768.
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medical practice."16' Thus, the testimony of experts in the profes-
sion was critical in the judicial decision to interfere with parental
rights by rejecting the alternative treatment, just as it had been
crucial in the court's original interference with parental autonomy
by affirmatively ordering the chemotherapy treatment.
The parents presented four expert witnesses, in support of the
assertion that metabolic therapy was an effective medical treat-
ment for their child's illness. Although two of the parents' wit-
nesses were physicians, none were licensed to practice medicine
in Massachusetts and none had expertise in the treatment of leu-
kemia.162 The court weighed the testimony of the parents' wit-
nesses against the testimony of experts presented by the state.
The state experts, several of whom had expertise in the treatment
of leukemia, were all physicians. 163 Their testimony was that the
chemotherapy program was an effective means of treating the
child's disease and was accepted as such by the medical commu-
nity. They also testified that the supplemental treatment program
of metabolic therapy proposed by the parents was ineffective as a
treatment of leukemia and was potentially harmful to the child.16 4
The court emphasized that the issue was the effectiveness of
the alternative mode of treatment in curing the child's particular
disease. The court based its decision to order the continuation of
chemotherapy treatment and to prohibit the parents from treating
their child with metabolic therapy on both the lack of proven effec-
tiveness of the proposed treatment and on the potential negative
effects of the treatment on the child's health, including the possi-
bility that the metabolic therapy could interfere with the effective-
ness of the chemotherapy program.
The importance of expert testimony in influencing the outcome
of a court's determination of whether an alternative means of
treatment is "medically effective," is illustrated by a comparison of
Minor and the case of In re Ho/bauer.165 The Court of Appeals of
New York decided Hofbauer between the time of the original deci-
sion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Minor and
the rehearing of the case. In Hofbauer, the court was confronted
with the issue of whether custody of an eight-year-old child, Who
was suffering from Hodgkins disease, should be removed from the
parents under the New York neglect statute.166 The parents in this
case refused to treat their child's disease with radiation and chem-
161. 393 N.E.2d at 838.
162. 393 N.E.2d at 839.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 844-45.
165. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
166. N.Y. [FAm. CT. ACT.] § 1012(f) (i) (A) (McKinney 29A 1975).
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otherapy, which was the mode of treatment recommended by the
child's attending physician. Instead, the parents placed the child
under the care of another physician who advocated metabolic ther-
apy, including injections of laetrile. The court refused to remove
legal custody of the child from the parents under the neglect stat-
ute, on the ground that the parents had exercised the minimum
degree of medical care for their child required by the statute.
167
There are marked similarities between the Hofbauer case and
Minor. Each child was afflicted with an illness which was fatal if
not treated,168 and the generally accepted mode of treatment in
each instance was chemotherapy. 69 However, the court in
Hofbauer distinguished the first Minor decision on the ground that
the parents in Hojbauer had not made an "irreversible decision to
deprive their child of a certain mode of treatment" in favor of no
treatment.17o In other words, the Hofbauer court characterized the
parental rights at issue in the first Minor decision to be the right to
choose between different methods of treatment, rather than the
right to refuse all treatment.
The child in Hofbauer was under the care of a physician who
was licensed to practice medicine in the state and this doctor testi-
fied as to the positive effects of metabolic therapy. Another signifi-
cant fact was that the metabolic therapy was controlling the child's
illness, and the physician and the parents both agreed that a more
conventional treatment, including chemotherapy treatments,
would be administered to the child if his condition deteriorated.'
7'
In the second Minor decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts distinguished the Hofbauer decision on the ground
that the evidence introduced in that case indicated that the alter-
native medical treatment proposed by the parents was an effective
alternative in treating the child's illness. The Minor court stated:
The medical evidence in that case [Holbauerl was sharply conflicting,
with two physicians opining that there had been a progression of the dis-
ease and denouncing nutritional therapy as ineffective. However, there
was also evidence from two other physicians that nutritional therapy is
effective and further testimony from an attending physician that the nutri-
tional treatment being administered to the child was controlling his condi-
tion and that conventional treatment would be utilized if necessary. In
short, there was substantial evidence, even though contradicted by other
evidence, to warrant the trial judge's decision. This is a far cry from the
unsupported stance of the parents in the instant case, and the compelling
167: 47 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 393 N.E.2d at 1015, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940-41.
168. Id. at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1011, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938; Custody of a Minor, 379
N.E.2d at 1063.
169. In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d at 653, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939; Cus-
tody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1057.
170. 47 N.Y.2d at 656, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
171. Id. at 653-54, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
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evidence that for this child metabolic therapy, including the use of laetrile,
is useless and dangerous.
1 7 2
Ho/bauer has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that
a parent has a "certain freedom of choice in determining the ther-
apy for a desperately sick child."'17 3 While the case may be inter-
preted in this manner, it is apparent, in view of the second Minor
court's reading of the case, that this parental "freedom of choice"
to administer non-conventional forms of alternative treatment may
only arise after the parent has met a high burden of proof to
demonstrate that the alternative is in accordance with sound medi-
cal practice. Through the testimony of expert physicians who were
familiar with the treatment of the child's disease, the parents in
Hofbauer were able to meet their burden of proof. However, the
parents in the rehearing of Minor did not meet this burden. The
conflicting results of the two cases make it evident that expert tes-
timony is crucial in the determination of what constitutes an effec-
tive alternative treatment and whether parental prerogatives will
prevail.
The court emphasized in the rehearing of Minor that what con-
stitutes an effective alternative medical treatment depends on its
acceptance by physicians licensed in that state who specialize in
treating the type of disease with which the child is afflicted.' 7 4
Therefore, as the state of the art improves in this area of medicine,
the meaning of "effective alternative treatment," as interpreted by
the medical profession and by the courts, will change.
V. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in
Custody of a Minor constitutes a judicial expansion of the state's
authority to intervene in traditional realms of parental autonomy.
The court's application of "the substantial chance for cure" test en-
larges the state's power to interfere with parental rights to refuse
medical treatment for their children. By placing a heavy burden of
proof on the parent to show that a preferred alternative treatment
is, in fact, a "medically effective" procedure, the court's decision
indicates a judicial willingness to limit parental rights to choose
between possible means of treating a child's illness. The court's
reliance on expert testimony and statistical data signifies the im-
portant impact future advances in medical technology may have
on judicial weighing of the rights and interests of the parties, def-
172. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 846.
173. Pendergast, supra note 57, at 580-81.
174. 393 N.E.2d at 845-46.
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nition of a "substantial chance for cure," and determination of
what constitutes an "effective alternative medical treatment."
With constantly advancing medical technology, the legal deter-
mination of when to intervene in parental autonomy in the deci-
sion-making process involving the medical care of minor children
will necessarily change. As the medical profession increases its
ability to offer hope for cures for childhood illnesses, the scope of
parental rights to refuse medical treatment for minor children will
necessarily narrow. The advancement of medical technology,
therefore, has the effect of broadening the state's authority to in-
tervene in the parental decision-making process of whether to
treat a child's illness. As more "cures" are developed, more dis-
eases will be recognized as "curable" within the "substantial
chance for cure" test.
On the other hand, the advancement of medical technology may
provide more parental autonomy, not in the decision of whether to
treat a child's illness, but in determining which method of treat-
ment to use. As more treatments are recognized as medically ef-
fective alternatives, parents may acquire more autonomy to choose
between treatments, and to weigh the benefits and disadvantages
of any particular alternative treatment on their minor child.
Finally, the potential disruption of family relationships, arising
from state intervention in the medical decision-making process, is
a factor which should be given more consideration in future court
decisions. Even when treatment may afford physicial benefits, it
may, under some circumstances, be contrary to the best interests
of the child. This is particularly true in a case like Minor where
proposed medical treatment offers only a possibility of cure, albeit
a "substantial" one. In such instances, stress within the family,
resulting from both intervention and adverse effects of treatment,
may be severe enough to outweigh the potential benefits.
Elisabeth Townsend Davis '81
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